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THE DEFENSE OF ILLEGALITY AS APPLIED TO THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
During the period 1936-40, Bruce's Juices, Inc., a rela-
tively small scale canner of fruit juices, purchased most of
its cans from the American Can Co. An open account debt
which accumulated for the price of the cans was put into the
form of promissory notes. Litigation began when Bruce's
Juices defaulted and American Can sued to recover upon the
notes. Bruce's Juices pleaded illegality as an affirmative
defense, basing the plea upon the ground that the notes rep-
resented obligations under sales contracts which were unen-
forceable under the Robinson-Patman Act' because of dis-
criminatory practices as to quantity discounts. The Florida
courts refused to sustain the defense, 2 and on certiorari the
Supreme Court affirmed. The remedies provided by Congress
in the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act
are exclusive; hence a violation of the Act will not bar the
violator from recovery in a suit to enforce rights which arose
under the contract which constituted the violation.3 Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947).4
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§13, 13(b), 21(a) (1940).
2. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 155 Fla. 877, 22 So.2d
461 (1945). The Supreme Court of Florida first. reversed the
trial court in a 5-2 decision, but on rehearing affirmed, 4-3. See
Note, 55 Yale L. J. 820 (1946), criticizing the Florida Court's
decision.
3. The immediate consequences of the holding in the principal case
will be of relatively little moment in the federal courts where the
triple damage- suit provided for by §4 of the Clayton Act is
available as a counterclaim. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §15
(1940); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944); Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Agar Mfg. Corp., 1 F.R.D. 579(S.D.N.Y. 1941). But the triple damage remedy is available only
in the federal courts. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1940); Freeman v. Bee
Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943). Therefore, under the holding of
the principal case, a vendee who has been discriminated against
and is sued upon the discriminatory contract in a state court must
pay the discriminatory price and then seek his remedy in an action
for triple damages in the federal courts.
4. A 5-4 decision in which Mr. Justice Jackson wrote the opinion of
the Court, and Mr. Justice Murphy wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Black, Douglas, and Rutledge, JJ, joined. On first argument
the decision below had been affirmed without opinion. Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 327 U.S. 758 (1946), rehearing
granted, 327 U.S. 812 (1946). For discussions of the principal
case, see Lockhart, "Violation of Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in
Civil Actions," 31 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 542-50 (1947); Frank, "The
United States Supreme Court: 1946-47," 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1,
16-18 (1947) ; and Notes, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 550 (1947) ; 47 Col. L. Rev.
867 (1947); 33 Va. L. Rev. 649 (1947).
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The decision justifies an examination of the case against
the background of the general doctrine of illegality as a
defense to a contract action,5 and an inquiry into the policy
considerations which influenced the Court in reaching its
result.
The Robinson-Patman Act amends §2 of the Clayton
Act6 and prohibits sellers from discriminating in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality where the effect is substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly.7 The alleged discrimination
in the principal case consisted of quantity discounts of up to
five percent granted to large scale purchasers. Bruce's
Juices was a relatively small scale purchaser and, except
5. It is worthy of emphasis at this point that in its opinion the Court
did not treat as decisive the fact that the suit was on the notes
rather than on the original contracts of sale. It is suggested, in
passing, that this consideration furnishes a possible ground for
distinguishing the instant case, should a similar one arise where
notes are not involved. It might be validly asserted in distinguish-
ing the instant case that the notes here were enforceable even
though the original contracts would not be, on the ground that the
surrender of an invalid claim may constitute good consideration for
a promise if the surrendering party had an honest and reasonable
belief in the validity of the claim. Forsythe v. Rexroat, 234 Ky.
173, 27 S.W.2d 695 (1929); Blount v. Wheeler, 199 Mass. 330, 85
N.E. 477 (1908); Restatement, "Contracts" §76(b) (1932). But
cf. Springstead v. Nees, 125 App. Div. 230, 109 N.Y. Supp. 148
(2d Dept. 1908). The point is not raised by the Court in the
instant case. For an instance of an equally tenuous distinction of
an antitrust case, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 214-16 (1940), distinguishing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
6. 38 Stat. 730 (1914). This section has been completely supplanted
in U.S.C. by the Robinson-Patman Act.
7. Section 1 of theRobinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13 (1940). This
section does not prohibit all quantity discounts, but expressly per-
mits those which "make only due allowance for differences in the
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which .... commodities are .... sold or
delivered." Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§13 (a) (1940), provides criminal sanctions of fine and imprison-
ment for intentional discrimination "for the purpose of destroymig
competition, or eliminating a competitor." In addition to the triple
damage action, n.3, supra, other remedies provided by the Clayton
Act are: (1) The government suit in equity to enjoin further viola-
tions. Clayton Act §15, 15 U.S.C. §25 (1940); (2) Petition by
the injured party to a federal court for injunctive relief. Clayton
Act §16, 15 U.S.C. §26 (1940); (3) The Federal Trade Com-
mission's cease and desist order, oxpressly authorized by §1(b) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13(b) (1940). None of
these remedies could have been of any aid to Bruce's Juices in the
principal case, since the discrimination here complained of was an
accomplished fact which could not be affected by an injunction or
cease and desist order.
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for one year when it qualified for a one percent discount, could
not qualify for the quantity discount, with the result that it
ordinarily was charged five percent more for its cans than
were its largest competitors. Bruce's Juices contended al-
ternatively that the alleged discrimination was either a crim-
inal or a civil violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. If the
discrimination was criminal under §3 of the Act, it was
argued that Bruce's Juices had a complete defense to any
recovery on the transaction. If the discrimination was merely
a violation of § 1 of the Act, Bruce's Juices claimed as a
partial defense that American Can could not recover on the
contract but only on a quantum velebant for the reasonable
value of the cans sold.
In refusing to allow the defense, the Court took the
position that to do otherwise would be contrary to the con-
gressional purpose. In support of this conclusion it was
pointed out that the Act prescribes specific sanctions, but
does not make uncollectibility of the purchase price one of
them. The Court discovered no express manifestation of
congressional purpose, but found significance in the fact
that the Act as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee
contained no sanction more extreme than one, subsequently
eliminated, of compelling remission of the excessive portion
of the price charged by a violator.8 Such congressional
action adds no strength to the Court's position. If Congress
abandoned one sanction in favor of more stringent ones,
that fact points more strongly to an opposite conclusion.
Furthermore, the purpose of the proposed Senate provision
was not to provide a less stringent sanction, but was instead
to provide a presumptive rule for the measurement of dam-
ages in suits by the victimized party and thus to obviate the
difficulty of proving damages, which had long been one of
the chief impediments to suits for recovery under the Clayton
Act by victims of discrimination. This point is made abun-
dantly clear by the committee report on the Senate Bill.9
In short, the Court, without adequate regard to the
overall purpose of the statute, could muster no more than
negative implication to support its determination that to
allow the defense of illegality in the instant case would be
8. See instant case at 750, 751.
9. Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
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contrary to congressional purpose.10 A search of the com-
mittee reports and debates on the Robinson-Patman Act
confirms the Court's conclusion that Congress did not express
itself directly on the question. There are, however, indica-
tions that the chief purpose of the Act was to increase the
effectiveness of enforcement of the congressional policy
against price discrimination.:"
A legislature, when it enacts a statute, necessarily acts
upon and in relation to the whole existing body of law
including judicial decisions as well as statutes. Congress,
in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, could not have been
unaware of the doctrine of illegality as a defense to contract
10. See Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584):
". ... for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in
general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the
common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hat resolved and appointed
to cure the disease of the commonwealth.
And 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office
of the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and
pro p7ivato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and
remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro
bono Publico." In 2 Sutherland, "Statutes and Statutory Con-
struction," §4501 (Horack's, 3d ed. 1943), Heydon's Case is com-
mented on as follows: "This rule has been reformulated, expanded,
restricted, explained, and rephrased, but the conclusions of it, the
applications of the law according to the spirit of the legislative
body remains the principal objective of judicial interpretation."
Representative Patman, co-author of the Robinson-Patman Act,
submitted to the Supreme Court as amicus curiae in support of the
petition for certiorari, a memorandum in which he said, in part:
"Such a denial [of the defense] seems to me to be contrary to the
intent of Congress . . . . " Brief for Wright Patman as Amicus
Curiae, pp. 3-4, Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 326 U.S.
711 (1945).
11. The Senate Committee stated its objectives as follows: " .... your
committee feels strongly that every reasonable facility should be
afforded to the [victims of discrimination] to enable them to
recover damages they have suffered, and thus to induce their
active vigilance in enforcing the act, relieving the Government
correspondingly of the burden of its costs .. . ." Sen. Rep. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936). Further indication of Con-
gressional desire to strengthen enforcement of the Clayton Act
is shown by debates on the floor of Congress: "Mr. Gore. I desire
to ask the Senator whether the general purpose and object of the
pending bill are to strengthen the provisions of section 2 of the
Clayton Act, and to stop the loopholes and correct the abuses which
time and experience have developed and disclosed in that legisla-
lation." "Mr. Logan. [Chairman of the Senate subcommittee to
which the bill was referred] I say to the Senator that the bill has
no other purpose . . . ." 80 Cong. Rec. 3115-16 (1936).
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actions. Federal and state courts had applied that doctrine
in relation to previous antitrust statutes which, like the
Robinson-Patman Act, contained no mention of the doctrine. 2
Thus it appears that legislative silence lends less than nothing
in support of the Court's position on the phantom "intent of
the legislature."'
If no manifestation of legislative purpose was authority
for dismissal of Bruce's Juices' defense, 14 then were there
12. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S.
227 (1909) (Sherman Act); Penn-Allen Cement Co. v. Phillips &
Sutherland, 187 N.C. 437, 109 S.E. 257 (1921) (Clayton Act).
13. For a recent article on statutory interpretation in general, see
Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," 47
Col. L. Rev. 527 (1947), in which the author at pp. 538-39 charac-
terizes the term "legislative intent" as a misnomer, and asserts
that legislative "aim," "purpose,"1 or "policy" is the real objective
of judicial inquiry rather than the subjective "intent." For a more
extreme position, see Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," 43 Harv.
L. Rev. 863 (1930), with which should be compared Landis, "A
Note on 'Statutory Interpretation'," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930),
and Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383,
385-86 (1908).
14. The defense of illegality in a contract action is essentially a judicial
rather than a legislative sanction, and no affirmative expression
of legislative intent is necessary to bring it into play. Since at
least as early as 1692, courts have been refusing to enforce bargains
made illegal by statute. Bartlett v. Vinor, Carth. 251, 252, 90 Eng.
Rep. 750 (1692). See also Cope v. Rowlands, 2 M.&W. 149, 150
Eng. Rep. 707 (1836). Difficulty, however, often arises in de-
termining whether the legislature has actually intended to prohibit
formation or performance of a bargain (to be distinguished from
the inquiry as to whether the legislature intended the doctrine of
illegality to be invoked). Much of the doctrine on legislative intent
to prohibit can be traced to a dictum of Lord Holt, C.J., in Bartlett
v. Vinor, supra, to the effect that every penalty implies a prohi-
bition though there be no prohibitory words in the statute. The
courts of this country have worked out certain exceptions to the
rigor of the rule as thus stated. If a statute imposes a penalty,
the court -may inquire into the legislative intent to determine
whether a contract involving the proscribed conduct is enforeable.
Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29
(1875); Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79 (U.S. 1851). But cf. Bank
of the United States v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527 (U.S. 1829); Bisbee v.
MAllen, 39 Minn. 143, 39 N.W. 299 (1888); Cheney v. Unroe, 166
nd. 550, 77 N.E. 1041 (1906). A contract made by an unlicensed
person is enforceable if the license was imposed as a revenue raising
neasure. Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky. 324, 246 S.W. 828 (1923).
But cf. Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89, 292 Pac. 112 (1930). Contra:
Yount v. Denning, 52 Kan. 629, 35 Pac. 207 (1894). But when the
license is required as a regulatory measure, a contract made in
contravention thereof is not enforceable. Vogel v. Chase Securities
Corp. 19 F. Supp. 564 (D.C. Minn. 1937). But cf. Frost & Co. v.
Couer d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38 (1940); Rosasco Cream-
eries, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E. 2d 908 (1937). For
further consideration of the general topic, see Notes, 50 Yale L. J.
1108 (1941); 32 Ill. L. Rev. 102 (1937). The defense has been
almost luniformly upheld if the statute declares formation or
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judicial precedents which supported the result? Urged that
holdings under the Sherman Act15 supply an analogy for
allowing the defense of illegality in the principal case, the
Court accurately stated that in those cases the defense has
been allowed only when the illegality was "inherent" in the
contract sued upon, and had as its object and effect accomp-
lishment of illegal ends which would have been consummated
by the judgment sought.16 Where, however, the contract
sued upon was not "intrinsically illegal," the Court pointed
out that the defense of illegality has been denied in the
Sherman Act cases. 7
An examination of the cases in which the defense of
illegality under the Sherman Act has been denied,18 discloses
that the only illegality alleged was that the vendor was an
illegal combination within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Such illegality is obviously not inherent in the contract sued
upon, and the cases seem entirely sound. The fact that one
of the parties to an otherwise valid sales contract is engaged
in an illegal business should not, without more, preclude
enforcement of the contract.19 But in the instant case the
illegality alleged has no such tenuous connection to the con-
tract sued upon. The Robinson-Patman Act makes not mon-
opoly but pgice discrimination illegal. Such discrimination
can be accomplished only by making or contracting to make
sales. Performance of a discriminatory sales contract en-
tails the specific conduct made illegal by the Robinson-Patman
performance of the bargain to be a crime. Cheney v. Unroe, 166
Ind. 550, 77 N.E. 1041 (1906); 6 Williston, "Contracts" §1763
and cases cited (rev. ed. 1938); Restatement, "Contracts" §580,
Comment a (1932). The same is true if the statute expressly
prohibits some act essential to the formation or performance of
the bargain. 6 Williston, "Contracts" §1763 (rev. ed. 1938); Re-
statement, "Contracts" §580 Comment a (1932).
15. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§1-7, 15 (1940). The Act provides,
in part, that "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states .... is hereby declared to be illegal."
16. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S.
227 (1909). See Bement and Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186
U.S. 70, 88 (1902); cf. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,
320 U.S. 661 (1944); Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,
317 U.S. 173 (1942).
17. See instant case at 755. Small Co. v. Lamborn, 267 U.S. 248(1925); Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S.
165 (1915) ; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
18. Cases cited n. 17, supra.
19. Fineman v. Faulkner, 174 N.C. 13, 93 S.E. 384 (1917).
1948]
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Act. Yet, in the instant case, the illegality was held not to
be inherent in the contract sued upon. In so holding, the
majority of the Court found comfort in the fact that no
single sale can violate the Act; that at least two transactions
must take place in order to constitute discrimination.2 0  If
this position is sound, and the illegality is, in fact, not
inherent in the contract, the case is posited on well established
contract principles2' and is hardly worthy of comment.
But illegality rarely appears on the face of a contract
sued upon. Courts must constantly look beyonl the docu-
ments and transactions in issue in order to determine the
facts and correctly adjudicate a case. Discriminatory sales
contracts are not unique in this respect, and the fact that
discrimination is a relative matter depending upon the ven-
dor's transactions with third persons provides no grounds
for classifying the illegality here as not inherent. The Court
has said, in effect, that illegality is not inherent in the con-
tract because it is necessary to go outside the transaction, in
issue in order to prove the illegality. Such a position seems
manifestly untenable and, if adopted generally, would prac-
tically eliminate the doctrine of illegality from the field of
contract law.22  This conclusion is ably supported by Mr.
Justice Murphy in his dissenting opinion.23
If, as has been demonstrated above, the decision in the
instant case was not strongly guided by either legislative
purpose or judicial precedent, then what were the real con-
siderations which led to the result reached? The Court
doubted that American Can's quantity discount plan violated
the Robinson-Patman Act, and may have felt that Bruce's
Juices' defense was a subterfuge to avoid payment for the
20. See instant case at 755, 756.
21. Cases cited n. 17, supra; Restatement, "Contracts" §597 (1932);
5 Williston, "Contracts" §1661 (rev. ed. 1938); Lockhart, "Viola-
tion of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions," 31
Minn. L. Rev. 507 (1947).
22. What the Court has done in this respect is, for the purpose of the
instant case at least, to effect a not inconsiderable perversion of
the meaning of th~e word "inherent." The power of courts to change
the legal definitions of words cannot be denied, and adverse criti-
-ism of such judicial redefinition has been intimated to be generally
a fruitless pastime. Gavit, "Legal Conclusion," 16 Minn. L. Rev.
378 (1932), reprinted in 9 Ind. L. J. 109 (1933). It does not
follow that it is fruitless to point out instances in which courts
have exercised their prerogative.
23. See instant case at 763, 764.
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cans purchased.2 4 The Court further believed that even if
Bruce's Juices could prove a violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act, it should be left to its remedy of a triple damage suit,
since the proof in one case would be no more difficult than
in the other, and since damages are no more speculative or
unprovable in one suit than in the other.25 This analysis is
unrealistic, for if the defense of illegality had been allowed,
Bruce's Juices need not have proved damages at all, but only
the illegality of the transaction. Further, the "adequacy" of
the triple damage action is made questionable by the great
difficulty and expense of establishing any antitrust violation,2 6
and by the fact that under the triple damage provision of
the Sherman Act there has been an average of only one
successful triple damage action every four years since the
passage of that Act in 1890.27 No reason appears why the
triple damage remedy as applied to the Robinson-Patman Act
should be substantially more effective.
28
24. See instant case at 745, 746. While it is impossible to tell to what
extent, if any, the decision was influenced by this consideration, it
should have had no bearing on the case as decided. The issue was
whether a real violation of the Robinson-Patman Act constituted a
defense. For a holding that a similar quantity discount plan is
not per se a violation of the Act, see Morton Salt Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 162 F.2d 949 (C.C.A. 7th 1947), cert. granted,
322 U.S. 850 (1948), a 2-1 decision in which Judge Minton wrote
a dissenting opinion. The case is noted in 42 Ill. L. Rev. 556 (1947).
25. See instant case at 752, 757.
26. Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action" 82-4 (TNEC Monograph
16, 1940). The difficulty of establishing an antitrust violation is
further indicated by United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp.
937 (W.D. Wis. 1938) where the defendant gasoline companies
enlisted 112 defense attorneys and expended approximately $2,500,-
000 to contest a suit which ultimately resulted in a fine of $65,000.
See Note, 49 Yale L. J. 284, 289 (1939).
27. Note, 49 Yale L. J. 284, 298 (1939). See also Note, 41 1ll. L. Rev.
462 (1941). None of the other remedies provided by the Clayton
Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act have any applicability
to Bruce's Juices' situation in the principal case. See n.7, supra.
28. Triple damage actions under the Clayton Act have not been sub-
stantially more successful than under the Sherman Act. Hamil-
ton and Till, "Antitrust in Action" 83 (TNEC Monograph 16,
1940). It is fair to note, however, that there have been a few
instances in which substantial triple damage recoveries have been
had for violations of §2 of the Clayton Act both before and after
the Robinson-Patman amendment. E.g., American Can Co. v.
Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (C.C.A. 7th 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 899 (1931); American Cooperative Serum Ass'n. v.
Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (C.C.A. 7th 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 826 (1946). By the terms of the Robinson-Patman amend-
ment, a plaintiff, to establish his action, must show not only price
discrimination but also that the effect thereof 'may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." It is
true that it has been held that in a complaint by the FTC, once
1948] NOTES
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The Court was concerned with speculating upon what
effects, good and bad, a decision either way would have upon
the conduct of business enterprise. To allow Bruce's Juices'
defense might mean that any common "garden variety" of
suit to recover the price of goods sold could result in a com-
prehensive inquiry into the seller's entire business opera-
tions.29  Another reason against an opposite holding is the
confusion which might result from permitting state courts
to adjudicate the complicated issues arising out of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act. The policy against permitting a buyer
to get his goods for nothing also favors the Court's decision,
although such a situation would not necessarily follow from
an opposite holding in the principal case.30
In its doctrinal aspect, the principal case represents an
innovation in the law as to illegality as a defense in a
contract action31 It has been suggested that the holding of
the Commission has proved sales at different prices, the party
charged with violating the Act has the burden of proving affirma-
tively that the discrimination did not lessen competition. Samuel
H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F.2d 378 (C.C.A.
2d 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). But no case has been
found in which this ruling has been applied to a triple damage
action. See CCH Robinson-Patman Act Symposium (1947 ed.)
78. Morover, the Moss case has been severely criticized, id. at
70-72, and its authority weakened by the recent case of Morton
Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 162 F.2d 949 (C.C.A. 7th
1947), cert. granted, 332 U.S. 850 (1948). Any extension of the
application of the Moss case would seem neither likely nor war-
ranted by a fair interpretation of the Act.
29. CCH Robinson-Patman Act Symposium (1947 ed.) 78. This ob-jection has merit, but goes as much to the policy of the Robinson-
Patanan Act itself as to allowing the defense in the principal case.
For the Act is highly "inconvenient" to anyone charged with its
violation, whether that charge be made in an original suit for
triple damages, a counterclaim of the same description (in the
federal courts), a suit in equity for an injunction, a complaint by
the Federal Trade Commission, or, as here, in an affirmative
defense to a contract action in a state court.
30. Bruce's Juices' most earnest contention was that the alleged dis-
crimination violated §1 of the Act, which carries no criminal
sanction. If Bruce's Juices had prevailed on this theory, American
Can would still have been free to recover the reasonable value of
the goods on a quantum valebant basis. Restatement, "Contracts"§600 (1932). If, however, Bruce's Juices had established violation
of the criminal provisions of the Act, it is true that American Can
could have nade no recovery. Restatement, "Contracts" §598(1932); 6 Williston, "Contracts" §1768A (rev. ed. 1938). The
Court accepted this rule as settled. See instant case at 748, n.1.
31. The case goes even further in the respect than has the New York
Court of Appeals in recent years. Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v.
Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908 (1937); Sajor v. Ampol, Inc.,
275 N.Y. 125, 9 N.E.2d 803 (1937); Fosdick v. Investors Syndicate,
266 N.Y. 130, 194 N.E. 58 (1934).
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the case should be limited to its facts, and that any expansion
of its principle to the contract field generally would be
unwarranted.32 But the familiar tendency of a principle to
expand itself to the limit of its logic cannot be ignored. The
possibility of such an expansion makes Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.




WAIVER IN DEED AND WILL CONTESTS
The heirs of a deceased grantor sued the grantees to set
aside a deed on the grounds of fraud, undue influence, and un-
soundness of mind. The heirs called two physicians to testify
to the physical and mental condition of the grantor. The
grantees objected to this testimony on the grounds that a phy-
sician is incompetent to testify as to any information acquired
in his professional capacity while attending or treating a
patient. The trial court admitted the testimony of the physi-
cians over this objection. On appeal, the Indiana Appellate
Court reversed, holding that the deceased grantor's privilege
of objecting to the admission of testimony of physicians who
attended him cannot be waived over the objections of the
grantees who seek to sustain the deed. Stayner v. Nye, 76
N.E.2d 855 (Ind. App. 1948).
32. Lockhart, "Violation of Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil
Actions," 31 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 548 n.215 (1947).
33. At time of writing there has been at least one reported attempt(unsuccessful) to use the doctrine of the instant case to overcome
a defense of illegality in a contract action. A seller who charged
more than the OPA ceiling price brought suit to recover damages
for buyer's failure to pay for goods sold. Defendant pleaded il-
legality ,and plaintiff urged the Bruce's Juices case on the Court.
In refusing recovery, the Court said: " . . . the fact, if it be a
fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that
a seiler's violation of another statute-the Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act--does not render unenforceable notes given for
the purchase price of goods . . . does not give a N.Y. court leave
to ignore or disregard the specific decision of [the New York]
Court of Appeals with reference to the effect of violation of the
identical statute here involved." Government of French Republic
v. Cabot, 16 U.S.L.Week 2240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 25, 1947).
34. The refusal of courts to enforce contracts involving violation of a
statute is often one of the most effective of the available sanctions.
If those who draft statutes wish to avail themselves of this sanc-
tion, it appears, as a result of the principal case, even more clearly
than before, that they must expressly provide for it. Not even
addition of criminal sanction will assure the result.
19483
